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An altruistic agent who may aid a person with a low income may
cause that person to exert little eort to increase his income. Such be-
havior generates a Dilemma, in which welfare is lower than when no one
is altruistic. We show how governmental transfers, which do not allow
for reallocation from a person who saves much to one who saves little,
reduces the eect, and can lead to an outcome which is Pareto-superior
to the outcome under a Nash equilibrium with no government taxation
and transfers.
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11 Introduction
Members of a family are often altruistic to other members. Think of parents
caring about their children. Or think of a husband and wife who support their
elderly parents. Though some family members may be altruistic, others may
be selsh. A child may want to obtain a large transfer from his parents, even
if that impoverishes his parents, and even if the transfer comes at the expense
of reduced transfers to his brothers and sisters. One mother-in-law may care
nothing about the welfare of the other mother-in-law and would be perfectly
happy to see a married couple give greater support to her and less to the other
in law.
Such attitudes make the donor's generosity a common pool, leading one
person, say recipient 1, to behave in a way which increases the transfers the
donor (say parents) makes to recipient 1, recognizing that the donor will reduce
transfers to recipient 2.1 Faced with such motivation, the donor may favor
policies which reduce the incentives of the recipient to behave in ways which
induce transfers.
The donor may benet by committing to make a small transfer. For example,
a parent may tell a child that even if the child has no income the parent will
give no more than $10,000. The child will then have a marginal incentive to
work. But an individual may nd it dicult to commit to his future actions;
in contrast, policy set by government, can eectively make that commitment.
Suppose the government enacts a law requiring the donor to pay $10,000 in
taxes and making a transfer payment of $5,000 to each of the two recipients.
That has two eects. First the donor's wealth declines by $10,000 and so he
will be less willing to make any transfer to either recipient. Second, the donor
cannot take some of the $5,000 government transferred to one recipient and give
it to the other. Therefore, each recipient has less incentive to reduce his own
wealth with the aim of increasing the private transfer he gets.
For intuition, suppose that the donor will transfer a xed total amount, say
$10,000 to the recipients. He will allocate that amount between the two recipi-
ents so that in period 2 the marginal utility of consumption to the recipients is
equal. Therefore, for a given transfer, the less recipient 1 saves in period 1, the
higher his marginal utility of consumption in period 2, and the less the donor
will transfer to recipient 2 and the more the donor will transfer to recipient 1.
Each recipient therefore has an incentive to save little in period 1. This race
between the two recipients is avoided if government taxes the donor $10,000,
and gives each recipient $5,000; the transfers a recipient gets in period 2 is then
independent of the recipient's savings decision in period 1.
One application of this reasoning is that a potential donor may favor a
compulsory government transfer program. For example, a person may favor a
social security system that transfers money to his elderly parents and parents-in-
law. This reasoning diers from the justications for social security commonly
found in the literature. Our model does not have social security tax future
1McGarry and Schoeni (1995) nd that parents indeed give greater nancial assistance to
their children with low incomes than to their children with high incomes.
2recipients of the government transfer. Instead, the model has social security tax
current potential donors who would otherwise or in addition make transfers to
current recipients.
2 Literature
Consideration of how altruism can lead to a moral hazard problem is examined
under the rubric of the Good Samaritan Dilemma (see Bruce and Waldman
1990). That in turn builds on literature which supposes that donors are mo-
tivated by altruistic concern over the well-being of the recipients of charity
(Hochman and Rodgers 1969; Warr 1982; Roberts 1984). A solution to the
Good Samaritan Dilemma is to have altruists commit not to make transfers;
in our analysis, in contrast, a solution is to have government commit to tax
potential donors and use the proceeds to make transfers to needy recipients.
We shall consider two potential recipients within a family, with each believing
that if he is poorer than the other, that the donor will reallocate transfers from
the less poor recipient to the poorer one. That analysis relates to the Rotten
Kid Theorem. Becker (1974) claims that if all potential recipients get transfers
from an altruist, then the potential recipients, even if selsh, have an interest
in maximizing the joint income of donors and recipients. Bergrstom (1989),
however, shows that the result fails if utility is non-transferable. We assume
such non-transferability.
Social security systems have been justied, or explained, on two main grounds.
One is paternalism (Diamond, 1977). The other justication is to alleviate the
Good Samaritan's Paradox described above, but without considering realloca-
tion of transfers across recipients (Buchanan, 1977; Coate, 1995).
3 Assumptions
The population consists of identical families, each consisting of one donor and
two potential recipients. Each recipient is selsh, his utility increasing only with
his own consumption. A recipient lives for two periods, endowed with wealth
w in period 1. In period 1 recipient i (i = 1 or i = 2) allocates wealth between
consumption and saving. The savings of potential recipient i is Si. In period
2 a recipient's consumption equals his savings, plus a transfer from the donor,
plus a transfer from government.
The donor has wealth w in period 2. His utility increases with his con-
sumption and with the consumption of each recipient. A donor can spend his
endowment on his own consumption, on a transfer to each recipient, and on taxes
which nance governmental transfers to the recipients. The donor's transfer to
recipient i is called di. In period 2 the donor pays a tax of T, with government
transferring ti to recipient i, with t1 +t2 = T. We emphasize symmetric behav-
ior, where t1 = t2 = T=2, but we shall show that similar results hold when only
one person gets a governmental transfer. Thus, in period 2 recipient i consumes
3Si + di + ti.2
The timeline follows:
1. The donor determines the tax he will pay in period 2, and the governmen-
tal transfers in period 2
2. Each recipient determines how much of his endowment to save
3. Government makes transfers to recipients
4. A donor makes transfers to recipients in his family
5. Utilities are realized
A recipient's utility from consumption in the two periods is
ln(w   Si) +  ln





; i = 1;2; (1)
where  is a parameter indicating the weight on consumption in period 2.
In period 2 a donor consumes w   d1   d2   T; his utility from such con-
sumption is ln(w d1  d2  T). A donor's utility also increases with the utility
of each recipient:
ln(w   d1   d2   T) + 

ln(w   S1) +  ln

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where  is the weight a donor places on the utilities of recipients in his family.
The governmental transfer T is determined, for example, by voting; no one
person's vote is decisive so that no individual donor or recipient can alter gov-
ernment policy: a donor must pay T, even if he alone wants to pay more or less
than that. A donor can increase consumption of a recipient in his family by
making private transfers. A recipient can aect the amount of transfer he gets
from the donor in his family by choosing his savings.
4 Transfers and savings with no commitment
A donor cannot commit to the amount he will transfer. Recipients simulta-
neously choose their savings, S1 and S2. After that, a donor makes private
transfers, d1 and d2 to maximize his objective function (2). His decision is in-
uenced by the choices of S1 and S2. Hence, recipients will choose S1 and S2
taking into account the donor's behavior.
Therefore, to analyze this game, we rst consider the donor's problem; after
that we analyze the recipient's choice.
2We can think of N identical families, each consisting of a donor and of two recipients. The
government's total tax revenue is NT, which is divided among 2N recipients in the population.
44.1 Donor's choice of private transfer
A donor maximizes the objective function (2) with respect to d1 and d2, subject
to the constraints d1  0 and d2  0. The donor's private transfers d1 and d2
depend on the sizes of recipients' savings S1 and S2, and on the governmental
transfer T.


















T; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j; (3)
then
di =





T  0; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (4)
If Si is too large to satisfy (3) yet Sj is suciently small to satisfy
Sj  w  
1
2
(1 + 2)T; (5)
then
di = 0; (6)
and
dj =







Lastly, if both S1 and S2 are too large to satisfy (5), then d1 = d2 = 0. See
Appendix 1 for the derivations. Figure 1 shows, for a numerical example, com-
binations of (S1;S2) satisfying each of the cases.
Let the private transfer from a donor to recipient i as a function of the
recipient's savings Si, the other recipient's savings Sj, and the governmental
transfer T, be d(Si;Sj;T) .
In the absence of transfers, a recipient's utility in period 2 increases with
his savings in period 1. A donor therefore is more willing to give the recipient
a transfer the less the recipient saved. As we will see later, if pre-commitment
for the private transfer is impossible, a recipient has an incentive to save little
and rely on a private transfer from the donor.
4.2 Savings by recipient
A recipient expects to receive a larger transfer from the donor the less the
recipient saves. He also knows that the recipient who saves less than the other
will get a larger transfer from the donor. Specically, recipient i chooses Si to
maximize ln(w Si)+ ln
 
Si + d1 + T
2

recognizing that di is a function of S1
and of S2.
Figures 2, 3, and 4 show recipient 1's utility (1). Recipient 1's best response
S1 to recipient 2's choice of S2 is also shown.
5There are three candidates for recipient 1's best response. From (3) and (5),































If recipient 1 chooses a value of S1 that does not satisfy (8), he will get a private











In contrast, if recipient 2 saves much, recipient 1's utility-maximizing savings
are:




Appendix 2 gives details about recipient 1's savings and the derivations.
Recipient 1 chooses between (9), (10) or (11), to give him the highest utility;
we call his choice of savings S1. The larger is S2, the greater is recipient 1's
incentive to save little, and to rely on a private transfer from the donor, as we
can see in Figures 2, 3 and 4.3 An increase in S2 reduces the donor's gain from
making a transfer to recipient 2, and increases the donor's incentive to make a
transfer to recipient 1. Therefore, the donor transfers more to recipient 1 when
recipient 1 chooses (10) or (11), making that choice more attractive to recipient
1. In contrast, if recipient 2 saves little, recipient 1 will get only a small transfer
from the donor, even if the recipient chooses (10) or (11). Recipient 1 will then
avoid saving little.
5 An equilibrium with little savings
5.1 Private transfers and savings in equilibrium
The game between the two recipients can have three dierent equilibria. An
important equilibrium has each recipient save little, so that each gets a private
transfer from the donor. Figure 3 depicts an example in which this outcome is






w; i = 1;2: (12)
3In some cases, as in Figure 2, recipient 1 may save so much as to induce the donor to
make no private transfers.
6From (4) and (12), private transfers are:
di =

1    + 2 + 2





T; i = 1;2; (13)






w +  ln

32
(1 + 2)(2 + )

w: (14)
To consider the conditions under which (12) is a Nash equilibrium, we ex-
amine whether recipient 1 gains by changing his savings from (12), given that
recipient 2 chooses (12).
Suppose that recipient 1 slightly increases his savings from (12), thereby
improving the intertemporal allocation of his consumption. The increased sav-
ings reduce the donor's benet from making a transfer. The reduced transfer
dominates the improved intertemporal allocation, so that recipient 1's utility
declines.
When, however, recipient 1's savings exceed some critical value, the donor
reduces his transfer to zero. Further increased savings by recipient 1 do not
further reduce the private transfer, so that increased savings improves intertem-
poral allocation of consumption, and so benet the recipient. Recipient 1's






S1 is too large to satisfy (3) (with i = 1 and j = 2) are
w  1
2T
1+ . Recipient 1's






















If, however, the maximized utility with no private transfer (15) is less than
the maximized utility with a private transfer (14), recipient 1 does not deviate
from (12). In the Nash equilibrium a person's savings are given by (12) and the
private transfers are given by (13).
If the governmental transfer is zero, whether (14) is larger than (15), and
whether in a Nash equilibrium each recipient saves in the amount given by (12)
depends on how much the donor places on the recipient's utility (), and on
how much recipients value consumption in period 2 ().
Proposition 1
Let  be the weight the donor places on the recipient's utility, and let  be
the intertemporal discount factor. If  is suciently large and  is suciently





w and each gets a
private transfer.
Proof See Appendix 3.
7In Figure 5, Area I corresponds to the set of (;) which Proposition 1
indicates. Equations which show the set of (;) are complicated, as shown in
Appendix 3.
Large  means that the donor is more eager to make a private transfer.
Hence, for a wider range of other parameters will the recipient enjoy higher
utility by saving little, and receiving a private transfer. Let  d denote the private
transfer from the donor to recipient i for the case discussed in Proposition 1,
where T = 0 and  is large. This  d equals (13) in which T = 0.
5.2 Governmental transfer
We consider whether a governmental transfer, which encourages recipients to
save, can be ecient.
Proposition 2
Let the private transfer from the donor to each recipient when there is no gov-
ernmental transfer be  d. There exists a positive governmental transfer smaller




and the donor makes no private transfer. Both the donor and the recipients are
better o than in the equilibrium with no governmental transfer.
Proof See Appendix 4.
To understand this eect, suppose government imposes a tax on the donor,
and makes a transfer to each recipient, equal to the amount of the private
transfer that a recipient gets in the equilibrium when government makes no
transfer. That is, T = 2 d.
As we discussed, an increase in the governmental transfer reduces the donor's
benet from making a private transfer. Therefore, even a recipient who saves





w, gets no private transfer. The amount the recip-
ient gets is the same as it was when government made no transfer. Hence, his
utility is also the same as it was, (14).






savings by recipient i do not further reduce the private transfer, so that increased
savings increases his utility by improving intertemporal allocation of consump-
tions.
Therefore, his utility (15) when saving
w  1
2T
1+ is strictly higher than his





w. Even when T is to somewhat smaller than
2 d, the recipient gains by increasing his saving. Therefore, when 0 < T < 2 d, it




Such a governmental transfer benets the donor and the recipients. The
recipient's utility in the new Nash equilibrium is (15), which is higher than in
the equilibrium with no governmental transfer (14). Also, the donor's utility
from his own consumption is higher: in the new equilibrium, T < 2 d, and
8d1 + d2 = 0, his total payments, in the new Nash equilibrium, T plus private
transfer d1 + d2, are smaller than transfers in the initial equilibrium, 2  d.
Conversely, a Nash equilibrium with no governmental transfer is inecient.
As we saw in Proposition 1, Pareto ineciency tends to occur when the donor
makes large private transfers. Recipients depend on the private transfers from
the donor, and the competition between the two recipients to attract private
transfers makes matters worse.
A governmental transfer, however, need not always increase welfare. One
situation to consider has a governmental transfer crowd out a private transfer.
An increase in the governmental transfer reduces the donor's wealth, while re-
cipients become richer. Hence, the donor gains less from private transfers to
recipients. If the recipients' savings, S1 and S2, are suciently small to satisfy
(3), the donor will make a positive transfer to each recipient, yet the donor will
reduce private transfers d1 and d2 by the amount that osets the increase in
governmental transfer, as we can see in (4). Therefore, the sum of private and
governmental transfers, di + T=2, is unchanged, and each recipient's utility (1)






w as in (12), the utility-maximizing choice for recipient i in




w, and his utility is (14). This utility is independent of T.
Another situation to consider has a recipient get no private transfer, and so
gains from an increase in the governmental transfer. Suppose recipient i saves
so much that the donor makes no private transfer to the recipient (di = 0).
An increase in the governmental transfer increases recipient i's utility (1), as
the sum of private and governmental transfers to him, di + T=2 = 0 + T=2,
increases. Therefore, recipient i's utility when he gets no private transfer (15)
also increases.5
To summarize, an increase in the governmental transfer can increase a recip-
ient's incentive to save. Put dierently, when the government transfer is large,
the total amount of transfers (the sum of private and governmental transfers)
to a recipient is less sensitive to a change in his savings. To see this, recall that
the private transfer d(Si;Sj;T) decreases with the recipient's savings, whereas
the governmental transfer is independent of savings. When the governmental
transfer is large, the sensitive private transfer is very small, and so changes in
the total transfer will not induce recipients to reduce savings.
4We can easily check this by substituting di in (1) using (4).
5If saving by recipient i is too large to satisfy (3) or (5), then di = d(Si;Sj;T) = 0, as
we saw in section 4.1 and Appendix 1. We can check that if di = 0, recipient i's utility (1)
increases with T. The saving which maximizes (1) when di = 0 is Si =
w  1
2 T
1+ , which declines
with T. Recipient i gets a governmental transfer in period 2. Therefore, as T increases he
will smooth out his intertemporal consumption path by saving less in period 1.
96 Governmental transfer to only one recipient
One might think that governmental transfers are ecient only because an in-
dividual realizes that his increased savings will not reduce the governmental
transfer to him, so that he has greater incentive to save. But there is an impor-
tant added eect|a donor can reallocate his private transfer from one recipient
to another, but cannot reallocate a governmental transfer. To highlight this
eect, we consider a governmental transfer to only one of the two recipients in
each family, and show how it aects the behavior of both recipients. Let the
governmental transfer to recipient 2 be T. Recipient 1 gets no governmental
transfer. For mnemonic purposes, call the recipient who gets a governmental
transfer Recipient RG; call the recipient who gets no governmental transfer
Recipient RNG.
Recipient RNG's best response can take one of three forms, which dier from




If a recipient saves little, he will get a private transfer. If recipient RG saves
little, recipient RNG's utility-maximizing savings given that he gets a private
transfer are the same as (10). In contrast, if recipient RG saves much, recipient
RNG's utility-maximizing savings given that he gets a private transfer are
(   1)w + T
1 + 
: (17)
So Recipient RNG will choose between the values of expressions (16), (16), and
(17) which yield him the highest utility; call his savings SNG
Recipient RG's best response is not the same as recipient RNG's best re-




If recipient RNG saves little, recipient RG's utility maximizing savings given











If recipient RNG saves much, recipient RG's utility-maximizing savings given






Appendix 2 gives the details about the derivations. Each recipient will choose
between the dierent levels of savings to give him the highest utility.
10Suppose the weight () the donor places on the recipient's utility is large, and
that the intertemporal discount factor () is small. As Proposition 1 indicates,
if the governmental transfer is zero, the Nash equilibrium has recipients save





w and rely on a private transfer from the donor in
the amount  d. Now suppose that government imposes a tax on the donor, and
makes a transfer to recipient RG, equal to the amount that a recipient gets in
the equilibrium when government makes no transfer. That is, T =  d. Figure
6 shows recipients' utilities (1) and the recipients' best responses when such a
governmental transfer is introduced.





w, each recipient's utility
is the same as when government made no transfer. Recipient RNG gets a private
transfer of dNG =  d that is the same as he got when government made no
transfer. Recipient RG gets a governmental transfer T =  d, but gets no private
transfer, or dG = 0. Thus, recipient RG gets the same total transfer as when
government made no transfer.












reduced the transfer to him to be less than  d. Now, however, recipient RG gets
 d not from the donor but from the government. An increase in recipient RG's
savings does not reduce the governmental transfer but improves his intertem-
poral consumption allocation. Therefore, recipient RG increases his savings to
w T
1+ .
Recipient RNG will also save more, though not as much as recipient RG
will. With the government transfer to recipient RG, recipient RNG will save
( 1)w+T
1+ . An increase in recipient RNG's savings reduces the private transfer
he gets from the donor. However, the private transfer is less sensitive to a
change in recipient RNG's savings than when government makes no transfer
to recipient RG. When government makes no transfer and one recipient saves
little, an increase in the other recipient's savings induced the donor to reduce
the transfer to the high-saver and increase the transfer to the low saver. When,
however, government makes a transfer only to recipient RG, and recipient RG
saves much, recipient RG becomes richer. An increase in recipient RNG's savings
still induces the donor to reduce his transfer recipient RNG, but the reduction
is smaller than when government made no transfer. The less sensitive change
in a private transfer makes the recipient less eager to rely on it.
Thus, a governmental transfer to only one recipient benets both recipients.
The donor's total payments, T =  d plus the private transfer to recipient RNG,
which is smaller than  d, are smaller than total payments in the initial equilibrium
2 d. Therefore, the governmental transfer also benets the donor. In short, the
government transfer yields a Pareto-superior outcome.
117 Conclusion
Most work on altruism does not consider the interactions between potential
recipients|either only one recipient is considered, or else each recipient is atom-
istic, so that strategic interactions are absent. We do consider such interactions,
showing how they matter. A potential recipient recognizes that if he is more
needy than other recipients, the donor will give him a larger transfer. Such
behavior can lead to a race to the bottom, in which each recipient has an in-
centive to make himself more needy. Some governmental policies can mitigate
the problem. In particular, transfers by government which are not under the
control of the donor, and which are insensitive to the needs of recipients, can
eliminate the race to the bottom. The governmental transfer has two eects on
the behavior of the recipients. First, if the governmental transfer made to any
one person not aected by his behavior (as largely holds for social security) then
the recipient gets a greater benet from increasing his saving. Second, the gov-
ernmental transfer is not reallocated as a recipient saves more. The constraint
on re-allocation induces increased savings, and so increases eciency. This sec-
ond eect appears even if some recipients get no governmental transfer|person
A will save more if person B gets a governmental transfer. So the purpose of
governmental assistance to a person is not only to benet that person, but also
to address the moral hazard problem arising with people not given governmental
assistance.
Though we spoke of social security and of savings, the line of reasoning
can apply to other areas. Thus, a similar analysis can apply when a potential
recipient can choose a level of eort which determines his income. And the
mechanism we highlight need not be the only one in operation. It can make
a dierence only at the margin, or explain why donor do not strongly oppose
government taxes and spending.
128 Appendix 1: Donor's choice of private trans-
fer
The values of d1 and d2 that maximize (2) satisfy:
 1
w   d1   d2   T
+

S1 + d1 + t1
 0; (21)
d1  0; (22)

 1
w   d1   d2   T
+

S1 + d1 + t1

d1 = 0; (23)
 1
w   d1   d2   T
+

S2 + d2 + t2
 0; (24)
d2  0; (25)
and 
 1
w   d1   d2   T
+

S2 + d2 + t2

d2 = 0; (26)
where ti is the governmental transfer to recipient i, and t1 + t2 = T.
If both d1 and d2 are positive, from (23) and (26) we can see that both (21)











(Si+ti)  0; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
(27)






(w   T + Sj + tj)   ti; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (28)
When t1 = t2 = 1
2T, expression (27) is written as (4), and (28) is written as (3).
If d2 is positive yet d1 = 0, from (26) we can see that (24) hold as an equality.











(S2 + t2)  0: (29)
The condition under which (29) is positive is obtained as:
S2  (w   T)   t2: (30)
Substituting d2 and d1 in (21) using (29) and d1 = 0 and rearranging it yields
the condition under which d1 = 0. This condition is the inverse of the condition
(28) (with i = 1 and j = 2). When t1 = t2 = 1
2T, (29) is written as (7) (with
j = 2), and (30) is written as (5) (with j = 2).
Lastly, if d1 = 0 and d2 = 0, from (23) and (26) we can see that (21) and
(24) hold. Rearranging them yields:
Si  (w   T)   ti; i = 1;2: (31)
139 Appendix 2: Recipient 1's savings as a func-
tion of recipient 2's savings







(w   T + S2 + t2)   t1;(w   T)   t1

: (32)
When t1 = t2 = 1
2T, (32) is written as (8).
9.1 Appendix 2.1: Recipient 1's optimal savings limited
to the interval (32)









If S1 in the interval (32) makes (33) zero, this S1 is recipient 1's optimal savings





When t1 = 1
2T, this becomes (9). When t1 = 0 and t2 = T, (34) becomes (16),
and (34) for recipient 2 becomes (18). This value minus (w   T)   t1 yields:
(1   (1 + ))w + (t1 + (1 + )T)
1 + 
: (35)
As 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1=2, this is positive. Savings
w t1
1+ is higher than
the border of (32) and thus it is the optimal choice.
9.2 Appendix 2.2: Recipient 1's optimal savings limited
to the interval of S1 too small to satisfy (32)
The interval in which S1 is smaller than the right side of (32) is divided into
two intervals. In one of the intervals, S1 is smaller than the border of (28) (with
i = 1 and j = 2), but larger than the border of (28) (with i = 2 and j = 1), so


















14In the other interval, S1 is smaller than the border of (28) (with i = 2 and
j = 1) and the border of (31) (with i = 1). When (S1;S2) is in this interval,
the donor makes a transfer only to recipient 1. This interval is:
S1  Min






(S2 + t2);(w   T)   t1

: (37)
We rst consider recipient 1's utility-maximizing savings limited to the in-















If S1 in the interval (36) makes (38) zero, this S1 is recipient 1's optimal savings
in this interval. From (38) and (27) (with i = 1), this S1 is calculated as (10).
If (10) is larger than the upper limit in the interval (36), recipient 1's optimal
S1 limited to this interval is the upper limit of this interval. The value of (10)
exceeds the upper limit if:
S2 

   1   2









(1 + )(1 + )




In contrast, if (10) is smaller than the lower limit in the interval (36), recipient
1's optimal S1 in this interval is the lower limit of this interval. The value of













(1 + )(1 + )




Next, we consider recipient 1's optimal savings limited to the interval (37).















If S1 in the interval (37) makes the value of (41) zero, this S1 is recipient 1's
optimal savings in this interval. From (41) and (29) for recipient 1, this S1 is
S1 =
(   1)w + T   t1
1 + 
: (42)
If (42) exceeds (w   T)   t1, that is, if:
(   1)w + T   t1
1 + 
 (w   T)   t1; (43)
then recipient 1's optimal savings limited to this interval is the upper limit of






(S2 +t2), the last value is recipient 1's optimal savings limited to














(1 + )(1 + )

(T   t1)   t2: (44)
The right-hand side of (40) is necessarily larger than that of (39), and the
right-hand side of (44) is necessarily larger than that of (40). Therefore, to
summarize, recipient 1's optimal savings limited to the interval of S1 too small






















































t2, S1 is (10),

























(S2 + t2);(w   T)   t1

: (46)




























(T   t1)   t2,





(S2 + t2); (47)












(T   t1)   t2  S2,
then S1 is (42).
When t1 = t2 = 1
2T, (42) becomes (11). When t1 = 0 and t2 = T, (42)
becomes (17), and (42) for recipient 2 becomes (20).
10 Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1












16If (48) is positive, the Nash equilibrium has each recipient save little, as in (12).
When  = 0 and  = 1=2, the value of (48) is positive. Dierentiating (48) with




This is positive, and thus large  generates the Nash equilibrium in which each
recipient saves little. Dierentiating (48) with respect to  yields:
3 +  + 2










This is negative when  is small. Hence, the smaller  is, the more likely will
the Nash equilibrium have each recipient save little.
11 Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 2
We show that if t1 = t2 =  d (T = 2 d) and if recipient 2 saves in the amount
w t1
1+ , as in (34), recipient 1 will save the same amount.
From Appendix 2.2, if recipient 2 saves
w  1
2T
1+ and if (43) holds, the optimal
S1 limited to the interval of S1  (w   T)   t1 is S1 = (w   T)   t1. In
other words, recipient 1's utility increases with S1 in this interval. Hence, he
can enjoy higher utility by choosing S1 in the interval of (32). From Appendix
2.1, recipient 1 will choose (34).
Therefore, it suces to show that (43) holds when t1 = t2 =  d. From (13),
 d is calculated as:
 d =

1    + 2 + 2
(1 + 2)(2 + )

w: (51)
Using t1 = t2 =  d, T = 2 d and the equation above,
( 1)w+T t1
1+  [(w   T)   t1]
becomes :

















 + 2 + 2 + 22
1 + 

1    + 2 + 2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Figue  5
Tlpes of equilibria depend  on donor's altruiem (a )


















Recipient l's utility  as a function of savings (sr and sz)













Recipient  2's utility  as a function  of savings (sr and sz)
when government makes a transfer to only recipient 2.






Recipienf,s savipgs as a function  of the other's savings
when government  makes tranefer  to only recipient  2
a=0.5  and  p=0.2.
* 0.3+5
s.
---r------
I
I